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This study analyzes difference in efficiency among the U.S. rural hospitals using a two-
stage, semi-parametric approach. Data Envelopment Analysis is used in the first stage to 
calculate cost, technical and allocative efficiencies of Critical Access Hospitals (CAH) and non-
CAH rural hospitals. Following Simar and Wilson (2007), bootstrapped truncated regressions are 
used in the second stage to infer on relationship between the cost, technical and allocative 
inefficiencies of hospitals and some environmental variables. The estimated results show that 
CAHs are less cost, technical and allocative efficient than non-CAH rural hospitals. The results 
also show that Medicare cost-based reimbursement for CAHs has a negative effect on the 
efficiency of these hospitals while Medicare prospective payment system for non-CAH rural 
hospitals has a positive effect on hospital efficiency.   
 
Introduction 
One of the most important changes in rural health care policy was the creation of Critical 
Access Hospital (CAH) program which was introduced as part of the Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA) of 1997.  The objective of the CAH program has been to protect small, financially 
vulnerable rural hospitals that might be essential for access to health care services by granting 
them Medicare cost-based reimbursement, rather than to seek ways in which their costs might be 
reduced (Dalton et al. 2003).  A hospital that converts to CAH status has the advantage of 
receiving reasonable cost-based reimbursement for inpatient and outpatient service delivered to 
Medicare beneficiaries.  However, the hospital must meet several requirements before 
conversion.  Most importantly the  hospital must be located at least 35 miles by primary road, or 
15 miles by secondary road, from the nearest full service hospital; use no more than 25 acute 
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 care beds at any one time; the annual average length of stay cannot be greater than four days; and 
provide 24-hour emergency care services. 
Prior to 1983, the Federal Government provided payments to hospitals, under its Title 
XVIII Program (Medicare), in the form of cost-based reimbursement. This cost-based 
reimbursement gave hospitals few incentives to contain their costs and operate efficiently 
(Gianfrancesco 1990, Morey and Dittman 1996).  The rationale is that under cost-based 
reimbursement a hospital has an incentive to increase costs in order to receive higher revenues 
because Medicare pays for services on a cost basis (McKay et al., 2002/2003).  In 1983, 
Medicare replaced cost-based reimbursement with the prospective payment system
1 (PPS).  The 
PPS system was designed to promote efficiency in hospital operation by rewarding hospitals that 
are able to keep their costs below PPS rates and penalizing hospitals with higher costs
2.  The PPS 
system relies on the assumption that if a hospital can increase its net revenue by reducing costs, it 
will seek ways to increase the efficiency with which it uses its resources (Sexton et al. 1989).   
The CAH program has been designed to support small, isolated rural hospitals that face the threat 
of closure because of reduced patient volumes and rising costs.  CAHs receive cost-based 
reimbursement
3 for inpatient and outpatient services delivered to Medicare beneficiaries and are 
designed to address the needs of rural communities where full service hospitals are not 
financially viable (Capalbo et al. 2002).  However, there are some concerns that Medicare cost-
based reimbursement for CAHs might have a negative impact on the efficiency with which these 
hospitals operate.  In the 2005 Report to Congress, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
                                                            
1 The PPS system paid a fixed fee based on the diagnosis related group (DRG) allowing variations only for very 
serious cases that might require additional care and resources. 
2 Under PPS system, hospitals are allowed to keep the surplus between the PPS rate and actual cost of providing 
services. Conversely, hospitals can lose money if their costs exceed the PPS rate. 
3 Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals were paid an interim rate throughout the year, receiving retrospective 
payments from Medicare for the difference between interim payments and total allowable cost at the end of their 
fiscal year. 
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 (MedPAC) states: “Although the CAH program has helped preserve access to emergency and 
inpatient care in isolated areas, it may not have accomplished this goal in an efficient manner” 
(MedPAC 2005: 167). This study contributes to the research on hospital efficiency by analyzing 
differences in efficiency between CAHs and prospectively paid rural hospitals using a two-stage, 
semi-parametric model with a bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007). 
In this study, we try to answer the following two questions. First, are CAHs less efficient 
than the rural hospitals that did not convert to the CAH status? Second, is Medicare cost-based 
reimbursement one of the main causes of CAHs’ higher inefficiency?  Specifically, we calculate 
cost, technical, and allocative efficiencies of CAHs and compare them with those of 
nonconverting, non-CAH rural hospitals. In addition, we try to identify the factors that might 
affect performance of CAHs and check whether these factors have a similar effect on non-CAH 
rural hospitals. 
We hypothesize that CAHs are, on average, less efficient than nonconverting, non-CAH 
rural hospitals because of the differences in Medicare reimbursement facing these hospitals. 
While CAHs receive Medicare cost-based reimbursement, non-CAH rural hospitals are paid 
under the Medicare prospective payment system. Past evidence showed that cost-based 
reimbursement gave hospitals few incentives to control their costs and encouraged inefficiently 
produced services (Gianfrancesco 1990). On the other hand, the PPS system was designed to 
promote efficiency in hospital operation. Consequently, we expect that the mean inefficiency of 
CAHs to be higher than that of non-CAH rural hospitals.  
Literature Review 
The theoretical foundations of efficiency measurement are based on the seminal work of 
Farrell (1957) and include the measurement of technical and allocative efficiency using radial 
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 measures of distance to the production or cost frontier. Technical efficiency refers to the use of 
the least resources to produce a given level of output. Alternatively, technical efficiency may be 
defined in terms of maximizing output for a given level of input. Allocative efficiency involves 
selecting combinations of inputs which produce a given amount of output at minimum cost, 
given input prices (Hollingsworth and Peacock 2008). 
The empirical measurement of economic efficiency is based on the underlying idea of 
defining an efficient frontier against which to measure the performance of an economic 
organization.  Murilo-Zamorano (2004) and Worthington (2004) distinguish between parametric 
and non-parametric methods that have been used to estimate the efficient frontier.  While in the 
parametric methods a functional form of the efficient frontier is predefined or imposed a priori, 
the non-parametric methods assume no functional form. Alternatively, Jacobs (2001) classifies 
these methods as statistical or non-statistical, where statistical methods are based on assumptions 
about the stochastic nature of the data. Non-statistical methods tend to be non-parametric and 
deterministic (no statistical noise), whereas statistical methods tend to be parametric and 
stochastic. 
The parametric approach to efficiency measurement has been associated with Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA), which was developed independently by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977), and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). SFA allows the decomposition of deviations 
from the efficient frontier into a random error term, that embodies statistical noise and 
measurement error, and a one-sided error term that acts as a measure of inefficiency 
(Worthington 2004, Greene 2008).  However, SFA requires the specification of a functional form 
for the technology and an assumption about the distribution of the inefficiency error term which 
may be inappropriate or very restrictive. Hollingsworth and Peacock (2008) argue that SFA 
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 approach to efficiency measurement can lead to two significant problems. First, as a parametric 
method, SFA places restrictive assumptions on the functional form. This causes both 
specification and estimation problems given that little is known a priory about what functional 
form should be used. Second, the choice of the distribution for the inefficiency term is arbitrary, 
and is a potential source of model misspecification (Newhouse 1994).  
The majority of health care researchers have analyzed the effect of regulatory changes on 
the efficiency of health care facilities using a nonparametric method called Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Hollingsworth and Peacock (2008) state that DEA is by far the most common 
method for analyzing efficiency in health care. DEA, developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978), is a linear programming approach that measures the economic efficiency of a firm 
relative to a piece-wise linear-segmented efficiency frontier constructed from the most efficient 
firms (Hollingsworth et al. 1999, Worthington 2004). Being nonparametric, DEA has the 
advantage of requiring neither the assumption of a particular functional form for technology nor 
assumptions regarding how inefficiency error is distributed.  The drawback is that DEA assumes 
that any deviation of a firm from the efficient frontier is attributed to inefficiency.  Therefore, 
DEA makes no allowance for external shocks, statistical noise, measurement error, or omitted 
variables in the model (Greene 2008). 
Many of the studies of efficiency analysis have used a two-stage approach. In the first 
stage, DEA is solved and efficiency scores are calculated using only the traditional inputs and 
outputs. Then, in the second stage, the efficiency scores are regressed on some environmental 
variables thought to influence efficiency. This approach has been advocated by Coelli et al. 
(2005), Ray (2004), Chilingerian and Sherman (2004) among others. Important applications of 
the two-stage approach in health care industry include Sexton et al. (1989), Nyman and Bricker 
6 
 (1989), Kooreman (1994), Ozcan et al. (1998), and Rosko et al. (1995) analyzing efficiency in 
nursing homes, Chang (1998) and Chu et al. (2003) analyzing efficiency in Taiwan hospitals, 
Ferrier and Valdmanis (1996) analyzing the efficiency of rural hospitals in the U.S., Chirikos and 
Sear (2000) analyzing efficiency in Florida acute care hospitals. 
Methodology 
Building on the previous literature, we use a two-stage, semi-parametric approach to 
examine the efficiency of rural hospitals in the U.S. and disentangle the effect of reimbursement 
mechanism on CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. In the first-stage, DEA is employed to 
estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiencies for both CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. 
In the second stage, a measure of hospital inefficiency, obtained from DEA in the first stage, is 
regressed against a set of variables that are expected to influence hospital performance. One 
important factor to consider is how Medicare reimbursement policies affect hospital efficiency. 
CAHs receive Medicare cost-based reimbursement which is expected to be inversely related with 
hospital efficiency. On the other hand, non-CAH rural hospitals are reimbursed under the 
Medicare prospective payment system which is expected to be directly associated with hospital 
efficiency. 
In DEA, the efficiency of an organization or decision making unit (DMU) can be 
measured using either an input or an output orientation. Input-oriented measures keep output 
fixed and assess the proportional reduction in input usage which is possible, while output-
oriented measures keep input levels fixed and explore the proportional expansion in output 
quantities that is possible (Coelli et al. 2005, Jacobs et al. 2006). Following Ferrier and 
Valdmanis (1996), we adopt an input-oriented DEA approach based on the assumption that cost 
containment is a primary goal of hospital administrators and policy makers. Indeed, a hospital 
does not select the number of patients treated and, therefore, the output level is exogenously 
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 determined. However, the hospital still has to select the inputs so as to provide the output at the 
minimum cost (Ray 2004).  When input prices are available in addition to output and input data 
and a behavioral objective such as cost minimization is appropriate, a measure of cost efficiency 
can be computed and decomposed into allocative and technical components (Coelli et al. 2005, 
Thanassoulis et al. 2008). All the efficiency measures derived below are based on the assumption 
of variable returns to scale (VRS) for all hospitals. 
DEA measures cost efficiency in two steps. First, given input prices and output levels, the 
cost-minimizing input vector for the i-th DMU is calculated using linear programming (LP). 
Then cost efficiency is measured as the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost. A formal 
representation of cost minimization DEA is based on Ferrier and Valdmanis (1996), Ray (2004), 
Coelli et al. (2005), and Thanassoulis et al. (2008). We start with the observed input-output data 
from n hospitals or DMUs. Let y  be the m-element output vector of 
hospital j while x  is the corresponding k-element input vector. The input 
requirement set (i.e., the set of all input vectors that can produce a given output vector, y) can be 
represented as:  
     y   , y   ,………y    
     x   , x   ,………x    
         :       ;       ; ∑    
 
     1 ;       0      1,2,………,   
    m i n      :          
           (1)    
where X is an n x k matrix of k observed inputs, Y is an n x m matrix of m observed outputs for 
each of the n hospitals, and  λ is 1 x n vector of weights. The summation restriction on the 
elements of vector λ allows for VRS. For a target output level y
o and a given input price vector 
w
o, the minimum cost under the assumption of VRS is: 
.              ( 2 )  
The minimum cost of operation for a particular hospital is obtained by solving the DEA 
linear programming (LP) problem:  
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    0  
The optimal solution to this problem is the input vector, x
*, that minimizes the cost of producing 
the observed level of outputs given technology and input prices. The LP problem in (3) takes the 
i-th hospital and seeks to radially contract the input vector, xi, as much as possible, while still 
remaining within the input requirement set. The inner boundary of this set is a piece-wise linear 
frontier determined by the observed data points. The radial contraction of the input vector, xi, 
produces a projected point on the frontier which is a linear combination of the observed data 
points. The constraints in the DEA LP problem ensure that this projected point cannot lie outside 
the input requirement set (Coelli et al. 2005). In the LP problem in (3), all input inequality 
constraints are binding at the optimal solution, implying that there cannot be any input slack at 
the optimal bundle. In other words, when any slack is present in any input, it is possible to 
reduce the relevant input by the amount of the slack without reducing any output (Ray 2004). 
The cost minimizing input vector, x
*, can be used to calculate the cost efficiency of the i-
th hosp
         ′  
    ′   ⁄                                     ( 4 )  
That is, CEi is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost for the i-th hospital. In other words, 
the cost efficiency measures the factor by which the observed cost can be reduced if the i-th 
hospital selects the optimal input bundle, xi , and operate at a technically efficient point. Failure 
to achieve cost efficiency may be due to (a) technical inefficiency in the form of wasteful use of 
Subject to: 
                 ∑       (i = 1, 2, ……, k) 
                 ∑    (r = 1, 2, ….., m)          ( 3 )  
                 ∑   
                        (j = 1, 2, ……., n)    
i
i
ital, CEi, as: 
 
   
*
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 inputs, and (b) allocative inefficiency due to the incorrect mix of inputs (Ferrier and Valdmanis 
1996, Ray 2004). 
The input-oriented measure of technical efficiency (TE) of the i-th hospital under VRS 
can be 
  Subje
                    
   
 
                                                                    (5) 
   
 
     1   
   0       (j = 1, 2, ……., n)  
 minimum θ that reduces the input vector xi 
  *
fficient hosp
outputs using less of all inputs. The LP problem must be solved separately for each DMU in the 
sample in order to obtain a value of θ for each DMU (Coelli et al. 2005). 
Once measures of cost and technical efficiencies are derived, the allocative efficiency 
(AE) can be easily calculated as: 
             ⁄            ( 6 )  
The allocative efficiency shows by how much the cost of the hospital can be reduced if it selects 
the input mix that is the most appropriate given the input price ratio faced by the hospital (Ray 
2004). 
  
calculated by solving the following DEA LP problem: 
Min  θ   
ct to: 
                 ∑ 
  
                 ∑
                 ∑
                  
The objective of the LP problem in (5) is to find the
to θxi while guaranteeing at least the output level yi. The optimal solution to this LP problem 
gives         1 , where θ =1 indicates a point on the efficient frontier and hence a 
technically e ital. TE<1 indicates that it is possible to produce the observed level of 
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             ,     i = 1, 2, …., n         ( 7 )  
where    
    1/
e valid 
 




mental variables zi have used tobit (censored) regression. However, Simar and W
(2007) have shown that tobit regression for the second stage is inappropriate. Instead, they 
suggest an approach based on truncated regression with a bootstrap approach to provide val
inferences in the second stage. Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that DEA efficiency estimates 
which are used as a dependent variable in the second stage regression are serially correlated in
complicated, unknown way leading to invalid inference in the conventional two-stage DEA 
procedure. The truncated maximum likelihood regression used in the second stage is represen
as: 
 
          such that    
   1 ; zi is a vector of k environmental variables which are 
thought to have an effect on the inefficiency scores    
 ; β is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated; and εi is distributed N(0, σ
2) with left truncation at 1-zi β for each i. To provid
inference in the second stage analysis, Simar and Wilson (2007) suggest bootstrap procedures. In




 of Hospitals and the 2006 Medicare Hospital Cost Report.  The unit of observation for 
the analysis is the hospital.  The market area is defined as the county, a definition used 
consistently in hospital efficiency studies (Rosko 1999, 2001, Rosko and Mutter 2008). 
study focuses on the set of CAHs as well as a comparison group of nonconverting rural hospit
Following Rosko and Mutter (2010), the comparison group is restricted to rural hospitals with no 
11 
 more than seventy-five beds, allowing us to have two groups of hospitals of similar size (i.e., the 
average number of beds for CAH facilities was 39.01
4 while for the comparison group was 
43.82). After excluding observations with incomplete information and outliers
5, a final data 
of 1,310 hospitals (out of which 915 were classified as CAHs) was used in the analysis.  






t of full time equivalent (FTE) facility personnel 
and sta  
apital 
                                                           
, inputs, and input prices. In their excellent review of hospital efficiency studies, Ro
and Mutter (2008) emphasize that virtually all of the hospital efficiency studies included both 
inpatient and outpatient outputs.  In this study, the number of outpatient visits was included as 
measure of hospital’s outpatient output. This measure has been consistently used in all of the 
hospital efficiency studies. In addition, both the number of admissions and the number of 
inpatient days were included as measures of hospital’s inpatient output. Following Ferrier 
Valdmanis (1996), Valdmanis et al. (2008) and Harrison et al. (2009), we also included the 
number of surgeries performed as a hospital output. However, we disaggregated surgeries in
outpatient surgeries and inpatient surgeries.  
The inputs used in this analysis consis
ffed and licensed facility beds (Ferrier and Valdmanis 1996, Harrison et al. 2009). Rosko
and Mutter (2008) point out that, due to data constraints, the input price variables were similar in 
each national study of hospital efficiency.  Following these past practices, two input prices were 
used in the analysis: the price of labor, approximated by the sum of payroll expenses and 
employee benefits divided by the full-time equivalent facility personnel; and the price of c
 
4 While CAHs are restricted to 25 acute care beds, they have no restrictions on nonacute beds. 
5 For outlier detection, methods suggested by Coelli et al. (2005) were used. In addition, the method suggested by 
Wilson (1993) for outlier detection for non-parametric frontier models was used. Wilson (1993) states that the 
efficiency scores produced by DEA may be severely influenced by the presence of outliers in the data. 
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 which was approximated by the sum of depreciation expenses and interest expenses (obtained 
from Medicare Hospital Cost Report) divided by the number of facility beds. Summary statistic
of the output, input, and input price variables for both CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals are 
presented in Table 1. 
The primary va
s 







with Property Rights 
Theory (PRT) which suggests that for-profit hospitals pursue profit maximization (Rosko 1999).  
ted with the type of hospital reimbursement policies, ownership status, and the degree of 
competition in a hospital’s market. Medicare reimbursement policies have an impact on hospital 
profits and can create incentives for hospitals to operate more efficiently. For example, 
reimbursement policies under Medicare PPS create incentives for reducing inefficiency 
cost-based reimbursement gives hospitals few incentives to control their costs.  We follow 
previous literature (Rosko and Mutter 2008, 2010; Mutter and Rosko 2008), and use two 
variables to reflect the regulatory pressure of public payers: percent of Medicare admissio
((Medicare admissions / total admissions) × 100) and percent of Medicaid admissions ((Medi
admissions / total admissions) × 100).  Under PPS system, Medicare reimbursement policies 
place fiscal pressure on hospitals.  Therefore, the variable representing Medicare percent of 
admissions is expected to be inversely related with inefficiency when hospitals receive PPS 
reimbursement, as is the case with non-CAH rural hospitals.  On the other hand, CAHs receiv
Medicare cost-based reimbursement and have few incentives to control their costs. As a result, 
we expect that Medicare percent of admissions to be directly associated with CAH inefficiency.
Similarly, Medicaid percent of admissions is expected to have similar implications as the 
variable representing Medicare percent of admissions (Ozcan et al. 1998). 















y in which for-profit hospitals increase their profits is by reducing inefficiency.  PRT 
argues that when property rights are not clearly specified, incentives to promote efficient 
behavior decline.  Therefore, we expect that for-profit hospitals will place a greater emphasis 
earning profits and increasing efficiency than non-profit hospitals.  The ownership status i
analysis is introduced by using dummy variables that define public/government owned hospitals, 
private nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals.  
Following previous literature on hospital efficiency, a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
is used to measure competitive pressure in the hospit
e of industry concentration and was calculated by summing the squares of the market 
shares of admissions for all of the hospitals in the county.  This index equals one in monopoli
markets and approaches zero in markets with high competition. Higher HHI values reflect les
competitive pressure, and hence increased efficiency should be inversely related to HHI. 
An important variable that is used to explain hospital inefficiency is the hospital 
occupancy rate, which is included as a measure of the demand for hospital services (Ferrie
nis 1996).  It is defined as the number of inpatient days divided by the cumulativ
number of beds maintained during the year (number of hospital beds ×365 days).  Ferrier and 
Valdmanis (1996) found that higher occupancy rates in rural hospitals helped enhance effic
Similarly, Nyman and Bricker (1989) and Ozcan et al. (1998) found a positive impact of 
occupancy rate on efficiency because higher occupancy allows the firm to staff more efficiently. 
 Other variables included in the second stage model to explain efficiency are Medi
HMO penetration used as a proxy for general HMO penetration (Rosko and Mutter 2010), a 
 variable to represent whether the hospital participates in a network, and a variable to 
control for differences in the quality of health services provided by hospitals.  When a hospita
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 participates in a network, it has an agreement with one or more hospitals for transfer of patien
and sharing of resources and personnel.  This allows hospital to provide services at lower costs 
by allocating the treatment of patients across network members.  Thus, it is expected that 
hospitals that participate in a network to be more efficient than the ones that do not. Hospital 
accreditation status, as represented by accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accredita
Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), is a quality measure commonly used in the literature (se
for example McKay and Deily 2008). Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics for all 
variables used in the analysis for the set of CAHs as well as for the comparing group of 
nonconverting, non-CAH rural hospitals. 
Results 




ics of efficiency measures from three different DEA 
runs.  Column 2 presents mean cost, technical, and allocative efficiencies from DEA with pooled 




r CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. Columns 3 and 4 show the average efficiency leve
from separate DEA models for CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. The average level of cost 
efficiency is 60% for CAHs and 70.7% for non-CAH rural hospitals. Column 5 presents the 
results from Banker and Natarajan (2004) DEA-based tests of efficiency differences. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in inefficiency between CAHs and non-CAH rural 
hospitals. The alternative hypothesis is that the hospitals that converted to CAH status are less 
efficient than the comparison group of non-CAH rural hospitals. Based on this test, the null
hypothesis of no difference in cost inefficiency between CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals is 
rejected under the half-normal distributional assumption for efficiency scores. The result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the hospitals that converted to CAH status are less cost 
efficient than the nonconverting, non-CAH rural hospitals. The higher level of cost inefficie
for CAHs is due to the excessive use of inputs (technical inefficiency) and non-optimal mix
15 
 inputs (allocative inefficiency). The mean technical efficiency for CAHs is 72.5%, lower than the
mean technical efficiency of non-CAH rural hospitals of 79.6%, and the difference is statisticall
significant. This indicates that CAHs, on average, use more inputs to produce their output levels 
than non-CAH rural hospitals. In other words, CAHs over-consume 38% (i.e., 1/0.725 – 1) more  
inputs to produce their output levels, while non-CAH rural hospitals consume only  25.6% more 
inputs to produce their output levels than necessary. CAHs also have lower mean allocative 
efficiency (82.9%) than non-CAH rural hospitals (88.6%), and, again, the difference is 
statistically significant. These translate into a mean allocative inefficiency of 20.6% for CAH
while the mean allocative inefficiency of non-CAH rural hospitals is approximately 13%
Determinants of efficiencies: parametric bootstrap of truncated regressions. 











ry variables. In the model with pooled data, the primary variable of 
interest is the cah dummy variable which was found positive and statistically significant. This 
es of cost, technical and allocative inefficiencies are regressed against variable
d to influence hospital performance. Column 2 in these tables shows the results from
estimation with pooled data (i.e., combined data of CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals). Among
the variables used to explain hospital inefficiency, we include a dummy variable cah = 1 if the
hospital is classified as CAH and cah = 0 if it is nonconverting, non-CAH rural hospital. For 
comparition purposes, separate models for CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals are also estimate
and the results are presented in Columns 3 and 4.  A positive sign on the coefficient of an 
explanatory variable implies a negative effect on efficiency while a negative sign indicates a 
positive effect on efficiency. 
Table 3 summarizes the results from the bootstrapped truncated regressions of hospita
cost inefficiency on explanato
16 
 implies
ficant, indicating that government 







or the type 
while 
 
 that CAHs are less cost efficient than non-CAH rural hospitals.  To separate the effects 
of explanatory variables on the cost efficiency of the two groups of hospitals, separate models for 
CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals were also estimated.  
The coefficients of the ownership variables measure whether for-profit and government 
hospitals are more or less efficient than nonprofit hospitals.  The coefficient of the government 
ownership variable for CAHs was found positive and signi
CAHs were less cost efficient relative to nonprofit CAHs. A similar effect of government
ownership on cost inefficiency was also found for the group of non-CAH rural hospitals. A 
negative and significant effect of for-profit ownership on cost inefficiency was found for both
CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. This negative coefficient suggests that for-profit CAHs (or 
non-CAH rural hospitals) are more cost efficient than nonprofit CAHs (or non-CAH rural 
hospitals), a result that is consistent with Property Rights Theory (PRT).  According to PRT, fo
profit hospitals are more efficient relative to non-profit counterparts because the profit motive 
creates a strong incentive to reduce costs and increase efficiency (Rosko 1996). 
It is widely recognized that hospitals respond to Medicare and Medicaid payment 
mechanisms (McKay et al. 2002/2003, Rosko and Mutter 2008).  A large number of studies hav
shown that Medicare PPS places fiscal pressure on hospitals.  In these studies Me
ly related to inefficiency (Rosko 1999).  CAHs receive Medicare cost-based 
reimbursement and this provides few incentives for hospital cost containment.  One of our 
hypotheses was that Medicare cost-based reimbursement for CAHs might lead to an increas
the inefficiency of these hospitals. The estimated results show that mcrpct (a proxy f
of Medicare reimbursement) has a positive and significant effect on CAH cost inefficiency 
it has a negative and significant effect on the cost inefficiency of non-CAH rural hospitals. Also,
17 
 notice that the absolute value of the coefficient of mcrpct for non-CAH rural hospitals is twice a
large as that for CAHs.  As expected, the positive coefficient of mcrpct for CAHs indicates that 
Medicare cost-based reimbursement for CAHs leads to an increase in the cost inefficiency of 
these hospitals while the negative coefficient of mcrpct for non-CAH rural hospitals implies that 
Medicare PPS has a positive effect on the cost efficiency of these hospitals. The insignificant 
coefficient of mcrpct in the model with pooled data comes to confirm the opposite and offsetti
effects mcrpct has on the two groups of hospitals. The coefficient of mcdpct variable was found 
positive and significant for CAHs; however, it was insignificant for non-CAH rural hospitals.  
The coefficient of occupancy rate variable was negative and significant for both CAHs 
and non-CAH rural hospitals, as well as when the two groups were pooled together.  The results 










ency of analyzed hospitals. The results are consistent with Ferrier and Valdmanis (1996)
who found that occupancy rate in rural hospitals, was strong, positively correlated with cost, 
technical and scale efficiencies.   Similar to Rosko and Mutter (2010), the coefficient of 
Medicare HMO penetration was negative and significant for CAHs as well as when the two 
groups were pooled together. 
 Table 4 shows the estimated results from the bootstrapped truncated regressions o
technical inefficiency on environmental variables. In the model with pooled data, the cah dum
variable was positive and stati
t than nonconverting, non-CAH rural hospitals. The effect of ownership variables on
technical efficiency was similar to the case when cost efficiency was analyzed. Specifically, the 
coefficient of government ownership was positive and significant indicating that governme
hospitals were less technical efficient than nonprofit hospitals, while the coefficient of for-pro
18 
 ownership was significant only for CAHs indicating that for-profit CAHs were more technical 
efficient than nonprofit CAHs. While the coefficient of mcrpct was insignificant, the coefficie
of mcdpct was positive and significant indicating that Medicaid is a source of technical 
inefficiency for both CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals. The coefficient of occupancy rate wa
negative, significant and large in magnitude for both groups of hospitals indicating that an 
increase in occupancy rate leads to a large decrease in technical inefficiency.  A negative
significant (at the 10% level of significance) coefficient for both groups of hospitals was also 
found for Medicare HMO penetration. The coefficient of jcaho was positive and significant
both CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals indicating that hospitals that offer higher levels of 
quality tend to be more technical inefficient. Finally, the negative coefficient of hhi, implying 
that as market competition is decreased technical efficiency of CAHs increases, is consistent 
with the practice of service-based competition (Robinson and Luft 1985, Noether 1988, Rosk
1996).  
The results from the bootstrap truncated regressions of allocative inefficiency on 












t than non-CAH rural hospitals. The estimated coefficients of ownership variables
indicate that government CAHs were less efficient than nonprofit CAHs while for-profit non-
CAH rural hospitals were more efficient than nonprofit non-CAH rural hospitals. Similar to th
case when cost inefficiency was analyzed, mcrpct has a positive and significant effect on C
allocative inefficiency while it has a negative and significant effect on the allocative  inefficien
of non-CAH rural hospitals.  The effect of occupancy rate on allocative inefficiency was positive 
and significant, a result consistent with Ferrier and Valdmanis (1996).  Two unexpected results 
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 were that the coefficient of netwrk was positive and significant for non-CAH rural hospitals 
while the coefficient of jcaho was negative and significant for CAHs.  
   Conclusions 
  An important objective of this paper was to determine whether CAHs are less efficien
than prospectively paid non-CAH rural hospitals. Using DEA, efficiency m
t 
easures for both 






ated regressions showed that the 
effect o ically, 
 
C nd non-CAH 
CAHs were less cost, technical and allocatively efficient than non-CAH rural hospitals and the 
difference was statistical significant for all three measures of efficiency. In the second stage,
bootstrapped truncated regressions were estimated in which measures of cost, technical and 
allocative inefficiencies were regressed against a set of environmental variables. The results from
the models with pooled data for CAHs and non-CAH rural hospitals also showed that CAHs 
were more cost, technical and allocative inefficient than non-CAH rural hospitals. Therefore,
results from DEA models in conjunction with the results from the bootstrapped truncated 
regressions show that CAHs tend to be less efficient than non-CAH rural hospitals.  It might b
the case that these differences in efficiency could be a consequence of less efficient hospitals 
choosing to convert to CAH status (Rosko and Mutter 2010). 
Another objective of this study was to identify the factors that might affect the 
performance of CAHs and check whether these factors have a similar effect on non-CAH rura
hospitals. The results from the second stage bootstrapped trunc
f ownership status on efficiency was similar for both groups of hospitals. Specif
government hospitals were less efficient than nonprofit hospitals while for-profit hospitals were
more efficient than nonprofit counterparts. A similar effect on the efficiency of hospitals had 
occupancy rate and Medicare HMO penetration, both contributing to increases in the cost and 
20 
 technical efficiencies of hospitals. Medicare percent of admissions (a proxy for the type of 
Medicare reimbursement) had an opposite but expected effect on the efficiency of hospitals.  
 The positive effect of Medicare percent of admissions on CAH cost and allocative inefficienci
indicates that Medicare cost-based reimbursement for CAHs leads to an increase in the 
inefficiency of these hospitals while the negative effect of Medicare percent of admissions on 
es 
the 





lth care services in rural 
commu
).  
cost and allocative inefficiencies of non-CAH rural hospitals implies that Medicare PPS leads to 
improvements in hospital efficiency.    
  While this study found that CAHs were less cost, technical and allocative efficient than 
non-CAH rural hospitals, a complete assessment of the CAH program needs to go beyond 
inefficiency and take into account issue
rural hospitals depend heavily on Medicare patients and their financial conditions can be heavily
influenced by Medicare reimbursement (Dalton et al. 2003). Policy changes in health care 
market since the 1980s (specifically, the reimbursement changes from cost-based to PPS) hav
resulted in the deterioration of financial conditions and, ultimately, in the closure of many small 
rural hospitals (Capalbo et al. 2002). The rationale for the Medicare cost-based reimbursem
CAHs has been to protect these small, financially vulnerable rural hospitals that are essential for
access to health care services in rural communities. 
In rural areas, alternative sources of health care are limited and rural residents sometimes 
travel long distances to health care providers. CAHs appear to reduce the cost of emergency and 
primary care for rural residents and to increase access to hea
nities. In addition, small rural hospitals like CAHs are sometimes the only entities that 
bring outside money into the communities, provide jobs, and attract new residents and 
businesses, thus playing an important role in the local economies (Doeksen et al. 1997
21 
 References 
Aigner, D., K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt (1977). Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier: 
production model. Journal of Econometrics, 6: 21-37. 
Banker, R.D. and R. Natarajan (2004). Statistical tests based on DEA efficiency scores. In: 
er, W.W., L.M. Seiford and J. Zhu (Eds), Handbook on data envelopment analysis. 
Capalb 02). Strengthening a Fragile 
Chang, fficiency: the case of central government-owned 
Charne
n Journal of Operations Research, 2, 429-499. 
oper, W.W., L.M. 
Chu, H
am in Taiwan hospitals: implications for staff model HMOs. Health 
Coelli,  duction to efficiency and 
nd
Dalton,
 Review 25(1): 115-32. 
e of 
ature Review and Procedures to 
Coop
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
o, S. M., Tyler J. Kruzich, and Christine N. Heggem (20
Rural Health Care System: Critical Access Hospitals and Telemedicine. Choices Fall 
2002: 26-29. 
 H.H. (1998). Determinants of hospital e
hospitals in Taiwan. Omega, Int. J. Mgmt. Sci., 26 (2), 307-317. 
s, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes (1978). Measuring efficiency of decision making 
units. Europea
Chilingerian, J.A. and H.D. Sherman (2004). Health care applications: from hospitals to 
physicians , from productive efficiency to quality frontiers. In: Co
Seiford and J. Zhu (Eds), Handbook on data envelopment analysis. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston. 
Chirikos, T.N. and A.M. Sear (2000). Measuring hodpital efficiency: a comparission of two 
approaches. Health Services Research, 34 (6), 1389-1408. 
.L., S.Z. Liu, J.C. Romeis and C.L. Yaung (2003). The initial effects of Physician 
Compensation Progr
Care Management Science, 6, 17-26. 
T., D. Rao, C. O’Dommell, and G. Battese (2005). An intro
productivity analysis (2  ed.). New York: Springer. 
 K., R. Slifkin, S. Poley, and M. Fruhbeis (2003). Choosing to convert to critical access 
hospital status. Health Care Financing
Doeksen, G. A., T. Johnson, and C. Willoughby (1997). Measuring the Economic Importanc
the Health Sector on a Local Economy: A Brief Liter
Measure Local Impacts. Southern Rural Development Center, SRDC 2002, Mississippi 
State University. 




tivity Analysis, 7, 63-80. 
search 25, 1-23. 
t of 
wth. Harold O. Fried, C.A.K. Lovell, S.S. 
Harrison, J.P., R. Ogniewski and S. Hoelscher (2009). The improving efficiency of Critical 
 Hollin  
 Health Care Management 
Holling  health and health care. 
Koorem
ealth  Economics, 13, 301-316. 
 Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Health Care Management Science 4, 103-115. 
dge University Press. 
 a 
national Economic Review, 18: 435-444. 
iencies. Annals of Operations Research, 67, 117-139.  
f 
 G.D. and V. Valdmanis (1996). Rural hospital performance and its correlates. The 
Journal of Produc
Gianfrancesco, F.D. (1990). The fairness of the PPS reimbursement methodology. Health 
Service Re
Greene, W. (2008). The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis. In The Measuremen
Productive Efficiency and Productivity Gro
Schmidt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 92-251. 
Access Hospitals. The Health Care Manager, 28 (3), 209-217. 
gsworth, B., P.J. Dawson and N. Maniadakis (1999). Efficiency measurement of health
care: a review of non-parametric methods and applications,
Science 2, 161-172. 
sworth, B. and S.J. Peacock (2008). Efficiency measurement in
Routledge. 
an, Peter (1994). Nursing home care in the Netherlands: a nonparametric efficiency 
analysis. Journal of H
Jacobs, R. (2001). Alternative methods to examine hospital efficiency: Data Envelopment 
Analysis and
Jacobs, R., P.  Smith, and A. Street (2006). Measuring efficiency in health care: analytical 
techniques and health policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambri
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) (2005). Report to Congress: Issues in
Modernized Medicare Program. Washington, DC. 
McKay, N.L., M.E. Deily, F.H. Dorner (2002/2003). Ownership and changes in hospital 
inefficiency, 1986-1991. Inquiry. 39: 388-399. 
McKay, N.L. and M.E. Deily (2008). Cost inefficiency and hospital health outcomes. Health  
Economics, 17, 833-848. 
Meeusen, W. and J. van den Broeck (1977). Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions with composed error. Inter
Morey, R.C. and D.A. Dittman (1996). Cost pass-throgh reimbursement to hospitals and their 
impacts on operating effic
Murillo-Zamorano, L.R. (2004). Economic efficiency and frontier techniques. Journal o
Economic Surveys, 18 (1), 33-77. 
23 
 Mutter, R.L. and M.D. Rosko (2008). “The impact of ownership on the cost-efficiency of U.S. 
hospitals” in: Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, vol. 18. 113-
Newho how useful a tool for health economics? Journal of 
Noethe
Nyman, J.A. and D.L. Bricker (1989). Profit incentives and technical efficiency in the production 
Ozcan, Y.A., S.E. W
 
rnal of Health Economics, 4, 333-356. 
ing home efficiency. Medical Care, 
Rosko,
Rosko,
Care Management Science, 2, 63-74. 
cy: a 
. Med Care Res Rev 65(2): 
Rosko, M.D. and R.L. Mutter (2010). Inefficiency differences between Critical Access Hospitals 
Sexton
ome efficiency. Medical Care. 27 (2): 154-163. 
138.     
use, J. (1994). Frontier estimation: 
Health Economics, 13, 317-322. 
r, M. (1988). Competition among hospitals. Journal of Health Economics, 7, 259-284. 
of nursing home care. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 71 (4), 586-594. 
ogen, L.W. Mau (1998). Efficiency evaluation of skilled nursing facilities. 
Journal of Medical Systems, 22 (4), 211-224.  
Ray, S.C. (2004). Data envelopment analysis: theory and techniques for economics and operation 
research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Robinson, J.C. and H.S. Luft (1985). The impact of hospital market structure on patient volume,
average length of stay, and the cost of care. Jou
Rosko, M.D., J.A. Chilingerian, J.S. Zinn, and W.E. Aaronson (1995). The effects of ownership, 
operating environment and strategic choices on nurs
33 (10) 1001-1021. 
 M.D. (1996). Understanding variations in hospital costs: an economic perspective. 
Annals of Operations Research, 67, 1-21.  
 M. (1999). Impact of internal and external environmental pressures on hospital 
inefficiency. Health 
Rosko, M. (2001). Cost efficiency of U.S. hospitals: a stochastic frontier approach. Health 
Economics, 10, 539-551. 
Rosko, M. D. and R. L. Mutter (2008). Stochastic frontier analysis of hospital inefficien
review of empirical issues and an assessment of robustness
131-66.  
and prospectively paid rural hospitals. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 35 (1). 




 Simar, L. and P.W. Wilson (2007). Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric
models of production processes. Journal of Econometrics
 
 136: 31-64. 
hanassoulis, E., M.C.S. Portela and O. Despic (2008). Data envelopment analysis: the 
. 
ut 
Wilson ametric frontier models with 





mathematical programming approach to efficiency analysis. In The Measurement of 
Productive Efficiency and Productivity Growth. Harold O. Fried, C.A.K. Lovell, S.S
Schmidt (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 251-420. 
Valdmanis, V.G., M.D. Rosko, and R.L. Mutter (2008). Hospital quality, efficiency, and inp
slack differentials. Health Services Research 43:5. 
, P.W. (1993). Detecting outliers in deterministic and nonpar
multiple outputs. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 11 (3). 
ngton, A. (2004). Frontier efficiency measurement in















 Table 1. Summary statistics and variable definitions. 
CAH (n=915)  Non-CAH (n=395)  DEA Variables 
Outputs  Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
admtot  Total hospital admissions  729.64 462.82 1,877.15  984.94
ipdtot  Total inpatient days  8,113.37 9,406.10 7,466.44  4,064.02
82 23,596.37 50,059.19  35,285.00
utpatient  surgeries  5 .26 07
Inpatient  surgeries  1 4
ices 
27 28 36 28
Price of labor($)  49,110.00 13,812.23 50,562.96  14,636.56
ond Stage V
Government  hospital  0.45 0.50 0.40  0.49
fit F
ofit Non-profit  l 
mcrpct  % Medicare admissions  60.82 14.64 52.31  12.77





vtot  Total outpatient visits  28,513.
suropop O 48.14 621 1,313.90  1,104.
suropip  04.63 142.56 21.11  363.32
Inputs 
bdtot #  hospital  beds  39.01 29.32 43.82  16.48
fte FTE  employee  148.90 85.55 246.63  122.17
Input Pr




fpro or-profit  hospital  0.04 0.20 0.10  0.30
npr hospita 0.51 0.50 0.50  0.50
mcdpct  % Medica
occu Occupancy  rate  0.46 0.23 0.45 0.16
hhi  Herfindahl  index  0.56 0.35 0.56  0.34
netwrk  1 if participate in a n 0.42 0.49 0.31  0.46
mhmo  % Medicare HMO penetr 3.80 6.92 2.90  5.58











 Table 2. Summary statistics and tests of efficiency measures. 







 (St.Dv.)  Eff. Diff. 
Cost Efficiency  0.595  0.600  0.707  1.935* 
(0.165) (0.169)  (0.165) 
Technical Efficiency  1.794* 
Allocative Efficiency  2.206* 
   (0.132)  (0.137)  (0.108) 
ions in p is. 
 
0.726  0.725  0.796 
(0.155) (0.158)  (0.143) 
0.821  0.829  0.886 




Pool CAH Non-CAH 
Table 3. Truncated regression results: c
  
cons 1.5998*** 1.7321*** 2.0343*** 
gov 0.1529*** 0.1406*** 0.1777*** 






a 0.5 0.56 0.4
mcrpct 0.0017 0.002
m 7*** 61** 0.0011 
occup -0.6354*** 0.5746*** -0.8448*** 
hhi -0.0611 -0.029 -0.0671 
netwrk -0.0184 0.0117 0.0073 
mhmo  0055** .0068** -0.0034 
jcaho 0.036 0.003 .0863* 
cah 0.3392***
sigm 349*** 61*** 143*** 
* ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
N Estimation based on  of Simar and W , with 2000 bootst tions for 
c ntervals of the estimated coefficients. (2) The st  were corrected fo  

















Table 4. Truncated regression results: technical inefficiency. 
   Pool CAH Non-CAH 
cons 1.9515*** 2.0060*** 1.8285*** 
gov 0.0853*** 0.0722*** 0.1465*** 






a 0 0 0.2
mcrpct 0.0003 0.0006
m 5*** 36** 0.0041* 
occup -1.6326*** 1.6362*** -1.7889*** 
hhi -0.0515* -0.0467* -0.0215 
netwrk 0.0094 0.0308 0.0153 
mhmo  0035** .0029* 0.0070* 
jcaho 0.0560*** .0755*** .0885** 
cah 0.1195***
sigm .2983*** .3110*** 906*** 
* ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
N Estimation based on  of Simar and Wi , with 2000 boots tions for 
c ntervals of the estimated coefficients. (2) The sta  were corrected f  
h edasticity using White 
 
lts: allocative inefficiency. 








eterosk method.   
 
Table 5. Truncated regression resu
cons -0.4200*** -1.2261*** 0.2537 
gov 0.0706** 0.0837* 0.0394 






a 0.3 0.4 0.3
mcrpct 0.0028** 0.0056**
m 45** 062* -0.0042 
occup 1.8197*** 2.7652*** 946*** 
hhi -0.0225 0.0372 0.0851 
netwrk -0.0396 -0.0554 0.1167* 
mhmo -0.0003 -0.0039 0.0066 
jcaho -0.0056 0.1223* 0.0393 
cah 0.2704***
sigm 636*** 525*** 120*** 
* ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
N Estimation based on Alg of Simar and Wils , with 2000 bootst tions for 
c ntervals of the estimated coefficients. (2) The stan  were corrected for  









eterosk thod.   